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I. INTRODUCTION
FtioR MANY YEARS, the aircraft industry1 and the Federal Avia-
on Administration (FAA)2 have acknowledged that counter-
feit, or "bogus," aircraft are a serious problem for both the
industry and the flying public. The problem manifests itself
not merely in reduced sales of new aircraft but also in higher
insurance costs, criminal conduct, death, bodily injury, and
* Chief Attorney-Product Integrity, Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. The views
expressed in this Article are the author's own and are not necessarily those of
Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. or its corporate parent or affiliates. The author
gratefully acknowledges the research contributions of Jo Saxe Kerlinsky, Esq. of
the firm of Coddington, Hicks & Danforth, Redwood City, Cal., and the stylistic
suggestions of Andrew Spacone, Esq., Assistant General Counsel, Litigation, Tex-
tron Inc., to portions of this Article.
I SeeJohn J. Lord, Jr., Use of Data Plates in Rebuilding Aircraft, Address at the
Organization of Flying Adjusters Conference (1985) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.); Robert L. Parrish, The Dataplate Swin-
dle, AVIATION CONSUMER, Nov. 1, 1984; Robert L. Parrish, The Burgeoning Bogus
Aircraft Business, Bus. & COM. AvIATION, Jan. 1985, at 64.
2 See 14 C.F.R. § 45.13(b-e) (1995) [hereinafter Prohibition on Removal of
Identification Data]; FAA Order No. 8050.4, 1 3 (Nov. 21, 1984).
3 See HOTLINE (newsletter of the Aeronautical Repair Station Association),
Nov. 1995 (citing Bogus Parts Racket Grows, AViATION NEWS, 1961) ("As a result of
the continuing appearance of bogus aircraft and engine parts in trade channels,
the Federal Aviation Administration suggests that aircraft owners and operators
be doubly sure of their source of supply.") (on file with author).
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property damage. This Article will describe the problem and
what some manufacturers are attempting to do to address it.
II. WHAT IS MEANT BY "BOGUS" AIRCRAFT?
A "bogus" or "counterfeit" aircraft is one in which the owner,
maker, or seller of the aircraft intends "to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive."4 This type of counterfeiting is ac-
complished through the use of trademarks, data plates, config-
uration, or other means of documentation. Counterfeit aircraft
may be fabricated from military surplus hulls, parts salvaged
from accidents, or new, used, and spare parts. Such atircraft may
be distinguished as counterfeit by the maker's effort to deceive
the government, the buyer, the service customer, or the original
manufacturer. As one court observed regarding counterfeit
non-aviation parts, "In other words, after your Mustang has been
squashed into a metal cube by the wrecker, you cannot rebuild a
Mustang from the scrap and sell it as a 'used Ford Mustang',
even though it was once a Mustang."5
Although the counterfeiting of aircraft is not a problem
unique to Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. and its helicopter de-
signs and models, the problem may be disproportionately mani-
fested in Bell helicopters as a result of the large number of Bell
commercial and military-especially military surplus-helicop-
ters. This author has, however, seen or heard reports of counter-
feiting of McDonnell-Douglas, Sikorsky, Beech,6 Lear,7 and
Eurocopter products.
The susceptibility of aircraft to counterfeiting stems primarily
from the following three circumstances: First, all aircraft certi-
fied in the normal, utility, acrobatic, commuter, or transport cat-
egories in the United States9 are required by Federal Aviation
Regulations to be identified by means of a fireproof identifica-
tion plate, affixed to the aircraft in such a way that it cannot be
4 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(b) (1995).
5 In re Circuit Breaker Litig., 852 F. Supp. 883, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
6 A Beech Musketeer that had broken up in flight was found to have been the
structural test article used for certification.
7 Two different LearJet models that crashed had apparently been stitched into
one aircraft. The certificate of airworthiness was eventually withdrawn.
8 For example, one Eurocopter, labelled BO105S, serial number S895, was re-
ported as destroyed on January 6, 1994, after striking power line§ and crashing
inverted. The aircraft was later reported to have been involved in another power
line incident on November 29, 1995.
9 Airworthiness Certificates, 14 C.F.R. § 21.175 (1995).
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'readily defaced or removed during normal service.' ° Second,
military surplus, crash damaged, salvaged, and other used parts
are widely and cheaply available. 1' Third, insurers that have
paid total losses on hulls have routinely sold the data plates and
historical records of the destroyed aircraft. 12 Examples of cir-
cumstances two and three, above, include the following:
BEST PRICE FOR YOUR RUNOUT or crash damaged Enstrom
or parts. Call Spitfire Helicopter Co., Jack Fetsko, (610)565-2986,
(610)869-2484, FAX (610)566-3621, (610)869-7764.13
AS350 BII, DATA PLATE with airframe log book, 1100 hrs TSN.
(919)255-0000; FAX (919)255-0001.1'
$$ WANTED DEAD OR alive, cash for your damaged and surplus
helicopters, parts, wreckages, turbine engines, anywhere. Call
anytime (716)384-5333 or write Dennis Clarcq, RD 1, Cohocton,
New York 14826. FAX (716)384-5080.15
Some case histories of specific helicopters may be instructive:
Example 1: A Bell commercial helicopter, Model 204B, serial
number 2057, was delivered on April 20, 1967, and crashed four
months later on August 18, 1967, near Seldovia, Alaska. The
owner advised the FAA that the aircraft was completely de-
stroyed by fire and requested its deregistration. In January 1968
a salvage buyer applied for registration of the helicopter. The
FAA advised the buyer that the prior owner had reported the
ship as wrecked and burned beyond repair, but "if the helicop-
ter has been rebuilt and you wish to have [the same number]
assigned," please send $10.00.16 The helicopter was remanufac-
tured using a heavily modified military cabin structure before
crashing twice more. A bystander injured by the debris from the
second crash sued Bell and the operator. In the subsequent law-
10 Identification atid Registration Marking, 14 C.F.R. § 45.11(a) (1995).
11 See, e.g., any issue of TRADE-A-PLANE which provides examples of used parts
offered for sale.
12 FAA Order No. 8050.4, 3.b. (Nov. 21, 1984). For another example, con-
sider this entry in the FAA title file: "Aircraft destroyed/scrapped. Insurance
company sold salvage." FAA Title File (Dec. 20, 1985) (referencing Bell Model
204B, serial number 2025). As will be discussed in more substantial detail below,
this was the second reported destruction of this same aircraft.
13 TRADE-A-PLANE, Jan. 3, 1995, at 99 (on file with author). As this and the
following examples suggest, the problem is not specific to one manufacturer.
Neither the author nor Bell Helicopter Textron is aware of any fact which sug-
gests any impropriety on the, part of the advertiser.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 This example is taken from a case file in the author's possession.
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suit, the jury exonerated Bell after lengthy deliberations.17 The
jurors later reported that they were troubled over why Bell did
not inform the operator that he had purchased a helicopter that
had been previously destroyed."8
Example 2: A Bell commercial helicopter, Model 204B, serial
number 2025, was delivered on July 15, 1965, and destroyed by
fire fifteen years later near Detour Lake, Ontario. The owner-
ship of the data plate was transferred from Canada to the
United States on May 5, 1981, at which time the logbook re-
flected a total aircraft time of 9805.9 hours. An FAA inspector
out of the Northwest Flight Standards District Office (FSDO)
signed a normal category airworthiness certificate for the air-
craft. In September 1985 the helicopter was destroyed in an ac-
cident near Clovis, California which was never officially
reported. The aircraft was subsequently deregistered with the
notation, "Aircraft destroyed/scrapped. Insurance company
sold salvage."19 In this example, although not unusual in these
types of matters, the insurer obtained a signed, but otherwise
blank, bill of sale from its insured so that the insured would not
appear in the chain of title.2 0 The FAA title file reflects that the
data plate subsequently passed through the hands of at least
four other owners before crashing on May 27, 1994, near Libby,
Montana. Subsequently, the data plate was sold for $75,000 to
yet another owner who stated an intention to remanufacture it
again.21 A suit was filed as a result of the 1994 accident and is
still pending. It should be noted that a military surplus helicop-
ter can be operated commercially for special purpose operations
under a restricted category certification.22 The only reason to
17 Id.
18 Of anecdotal interest is that the referenced aircraft was subsequently de-
stroyed on two additional occasions: on June 14, 1981, near Ketchikan, Alaska,
and on October 24, 1985, near Gerlos Platte, Austria. Bell obtained the data
plate from the Austrian authorities and destroyed it.
19 FAA Title File, supra note 12.
20 Interview by the author with the former owner and insurer. See also Lord,
supra note 1.
21 Interview between the author and current owner. This owner has subse-
quently reported that he has experienced a change of heart as a result of seeing
an advance copy of this Article and intends to return the data plate to Bell for
retirement.
22 Issue of Type of Certificate: Restricted Category Aircraft, 14 C.F.R. § 21.25
(1995). Under this provision, the owner must establish that no feature or charac-
teristic of the aircraft makes it unsafe when it is operated under the limitations
prescribed for its intended use. Id. The requirements for a standard category
type certificate are much more stringent, essentially requiring the owner to estab-
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recycle a commercial data plate is to expand the range of per-
mitted uses, thereby increasing the resale value of the hull to
which it is attached.
Example 3: Bell Helicopter Textron ceased manufacture of its
Model 47 series helicopters in 1974, but has continued to sup-
port them with spare parts, revisions to maintenance instruc-
tions, and safety bulletins. In 1977 Bell issued an Alert Service
Bulletin for installation of a retrofit kit providing for fiberglass-
wrapped fuel tanks and breakaway fuel lines to enhance the fire
crashworthiness of Model 47. No airworthiness directive was is-
sued. After that event, but prior to July 1982, an entity calling
itself "Olympic Helicopters" assembled a helicopter to the speci-
fications of a Bell Model 47 from spare, new, and surplus parts
acquired from various sources. Olympic did not install the fuel
system kit. It did, however, obtain certification for this aircraft
under the provisions of FAA Advisory Circular 45-2A.21 This he-
licopter crashed and burned. In the resulting product liability
lawsuit, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Bell,
which was upheld by the Sixth Circuit on the grounds that Bell
was not the manufacturer of the aircraft 4.2  Although the manu-
facture of this helicopter was not in itself an act of counterfeit-
ing, this example illustrates some of the legal challenges
associated with counterfeit aircraft.
III. SAFETY ISSUES
Counterfeit practices concern original manufacturers of air-
craft because of the threat to sales of new commercial aircraft
and the potential risk of increased litigation. One might well
ask why anyone else should be concerned. The most significant
consideration is safety. There are also obvious arguments to be
made that this practice damages the nation's industrial base by
reducing the market for new helicopters. This drives up the
cost of helicopters and spare parts and, thus, of operations for
legitimate operators and their customers by increasing the costs
lish compliance with the original regulations applicable for type certification at
the time the aircraft was accepted by the military. Issue of Type of Certificate:
Surplus Aircraft of the Armed Forces, 14 C.F.R. § 21.27 (1995). The FAA has
published a Notice of Proposed Rule Making for the abolition of this latter provi-
sion. 59 Fed. Reg. 19,114 (1994) (proposed Apr. 21, 1994).
23 FED. AVIATION ADMIN, ADVISORY CIRcuLAR 45-2A: IDENTIFICATION AND REGIS-
TRATION MARKING (1992).
24 Goldsmith v. Olon Andrews, Inc., 941 F.2d 423, 427 (6th Cir. 1991).
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of insurance and other liability-associated expenses. These
costs, however, are not the only considerations.
Example 3 illustrates one of many safety concerns. In the case
of helicopters manufactured from scratch in someone's garage,
there is' a high likelihood of some nonconformity with the pro-
duction certificate holder's quality or safety requirements. In
cases where commercial data plates are placed on military sur-
plus hulls built by the same manufacturer and the original tools,
processes, and materials are probably the same, why should
there be a discrepancy in safety? Why, in fact, should anyone
bother to put the commercial data plate on the military hull if
both can be operated commercially? Why is it that "[t] he FAA
believes that the practice of rebuilding a wrecked aircraft by re-
placing almost the entire aircraft and affixing the identification
plate which was recovered from the wreckage is not in the pub-
lic interest?" 25
The usual commercial certification basis of military surplus
aircraft permits only "special purpose operations ' 26 such as log-
ging, fire-fighting, and mineral exploration, but not the carriage
of passengers for hire. As a result of this, along with other fac-
tors such as age, condition, and plentiful availability (compared
to the superficially similar commercial models), military surplus
helicopters typically are available at very low prices. This situa-
tion allows for such a minimal initial capital investment that an
almost expendable class of helicopters is created. They are liter-
ally given away to local and state governments by the Depart-
ment of Defense. Both military surplus helicopters and their
counterfeit counterparts are found disproportionately in such
duties, which are among the most dangerous mission profiles
available for helicopters in commercial operation 7.2  The con-
tract and utilization rates for passenger-carrying helicopters
available from the U.S. Forest Service and the Department of
the Interior substantially exceed those for restricted category
aircraft.
Canada, a major market for older medium helicopters, does
not peimit importation and commercial operation of military
surplus helicopters due to the relative scarcity, higher earning
power, and original purchase price. Consequently, commercial
25 Prohibition on Removal of Identification Data, supra note 2, at 45,379.
26 14 C.F.R. § 21.25. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27 See Risk for Traumatic Injuries from Helicopter Crashes During Logging Opera-
tions-Southeastern Alaska, January 19 9 2-June 1993, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALrry
WKLv. REP. 472 (July 8, 1994).
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helicopters have a higher market value than otherwise
equivalent military surplus aircraft. Consequently, an instant
profit is thereby created by the conversion of a military surplus
to a commercial helicopter. At the same time, the available data
suggests that there is a direct relationship between the amount
of capital investment in a helicopter and the care with which it is
maintained and operated, as can be seen from Figure 1.28 As a
result, military surplus machines create a very high risk not only
to the flying public but also to their original manufacturers,
which are the usual targets when lawsuits result from accidents.
30-
25,





Military Surplus Bell Turbine General Aviation Non-Bell Turbine
IV. CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY SANCTIONS
The Federal Register states that "[t] he only person authorized
to rebuild an aircraft is a person who manufactured it under a
type or production certificate." 29 Federal Aviation Regulations
(FAR) provide that a licensed mechanic 0 or repair station 3l can
repair an aircraft, while only a manufacturer or production cer-
tificate holder may rebuild one. 2 FAR part 4533 was amended
28 USA Accident Rates-Data Supplied by NTSB/FAA 1989-1992. The military
surplus data was provided by Bell worldwide experience in the UH-1 series Jan.
1993-Sept. 1994.
29 Prohibition on Removal of Identification Data, supra note 2, at 45,379; see
also 14 C.F.R. § 43.3 (1995).
30 14 C.F.R. § 43.3(b).
31 Id. § 43.3(e).
32 Id. § 43.3(i) (emphasis added).
33 Prohibition on Removal of Identification Data, supra note 2, at 45,379.
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effective September 4, 1979, to "explicitly prohibit any person
from removing, changing, or placing information on aircraft,
aircraft engines, or propeller ID plates required by FAR section
45.11, and from installing or removing such ID plates without
the approval of the Administrator" of the FAA.3 4 Persons violat-
ing these sections are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed
$1000 for each such violation3 5 and another penalty of up to
$10,000 for falsely representing their actions to the FAA. 6
There are also penalties for falsification of records and failure to
file reports.3 7 In addition, these actions carry criminal sanctions
of title 18 fines and up to three years imprisonment.3 8 These
laws are not distinguished by their frequent enforcement. The
only reported decision regarding a conviction for displaying
false marks39 is one involving a pilot and copilot who crudely
altered the registration, number on their airplane's exterior with
tape and used the altered number in radio calls.40
A person, firm, or corporation which violates either of those
regulations and then falsely represents that the aircraft was man-
ufactured by the original manufacturer as denoted by the data
plate of the aircraft will violate one or more federal penal stat-
utes, including the following:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies,
conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material
fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.41
It is not a necessary element of this offense that the false state-
ments and concealment of material facts be made to the FAA or
any other federal agency, since the regulation and certification
of aircraft is a matter "within the jurisdiction" of a federal
34 FAA Order No. 8050.4, 1 3.a (Nov. 21, 1984).
35 49 U.S.C.A. § 46301(a) (West 1995).
36 Id. § 46302(a).
37 Id. § 46313.
3S Id. § 46306(b).
39 Id. § 46306(b) (3). But see Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Standard Relay Corp., 328
F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (illustrating a successful civil action against persons
who altered used military surplus relays to appear as new).
- United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 529-30 (5th Cir. 1982).
41 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
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agency.4 2 An almost inevitable corollary of any attempt to certify
an aircraft remanufactured or altered in violation of the FAR is
the creation and submission of papers containing false state-
ments.4" This action constitutes another violation." Similarly, it
is rare that a scheme using telephone, mail, or other media of
communication would not render the perpetrator liable to pros-
ecution for wire fraud4 5 or mail fraud.46
Offenses used by the Department of Transportation's (DOT)
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to prosecute bogus parts
suppliers include the following: 1) aiding, abetting, or willfully
causing an offense against the United States;47 2) endangering
the safety of aircraft in flight;48 3) conspiring to commit an of-
fense against the United States;49 4) interstate transportation of
stolen property valued in excess of $5000 with intent, to de-
fraud;5 0 and 5) making a false declaration on U.S. Customs doc-
uments.51 This list of- offenses is not exclusive. Rather, it
indicates that in recent years the DOT's OIG has increased its
focus on these types of problems. 2
There have been a number of instances in which a counterfeit
commercial aircraft, created by placing a commercial data plate
on a military surplus hull, enabled the counterfeiter to obtain
insurance-either directly or as loss payee on a financing ar-
rangement with the customer-for the counterfeit aircraft at an
agreed hull value of four or more times the value of the military
hull. This value is an even larger multiple of the counterfeiters'
actual investment. When the counterfeit aircraft subsequently
crashes, the insurance is collected at the inflated price. Under
this scheme, it is not really necessary for the operators of coun-
terfeit aircraft to make a profit on their operations because the
profits of what the victims of this practice have called insurance
42 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 935 F.2d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Brack, 747 F.2d 1142, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1216 (1985).
43 See, e.g., Murphy, 935 F.2d at 900; Brack, 747 F.2d at 1146-47.
44 See 18 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).
45 Id. § 1343.
46 Id. § 1341.
47 Id. § 2.
48 Id. § 32.
49 Id. § 371.
50 Id. § 2314.
51 Id. § 542.
52 A. Mary Schiavo, Misfits in the Sky: The Bogus Parts Problem, Address Before the
American Bar Association in ABA TIPS National Institute on Litigation.in Avia-
tion (Oct. 6, 1995).
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fraud are so enormous. At least one such occurrence is the sub-
ject of pending civil litigation in California. 3
Unlike such offenses as the fraudulent use of the 4-H Club
emblem 54 or "Woodsy Owl, '55 the fraudulent use of a specific
aircraft manufacturer's data plate is not the subject of its own
special federal criminal statute.56 The trademark laws, however,
provide civil penalties payable to the trademark owner for the
use of registered marks in a manner likely to confuse or
deceive,57 or for a "false designation of origin."58 The penalties
include the payment of defendant's profits, plaintiff's damages,
and the costs of the action.5 9 Other persons injured by this de-
ception may have a civil action for false description of goods,6 °
and multiple, intentional violations of the trademark laws may
subject the perpetrator to penalties of up to twenty years in
prison and five million dollars in fines.61
Repeated offenses of this nature-and it is also clear that-the
counterfeiting of one helicopter can open a person to prosecu-
tion for multiple offenses-can give rise to prosecution under
the anti-racketeering statute, 62 commonly known as the Racke-
teering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). To
the extent that an insurance company has participated in the
"pattern of racketeering activity," case law indicates that it may
be held liable for all the actions of the "enterprise," including
those of its employees.6 Authority stating that an insurance
company and its employees are not capable of civil conspiracy
for purposes of RICO6 4 stems not from any peculiar immunity of
insurers generally, but from the principle that the corporation'
53 Insurance fraud is a criminal as well as civil offense under the laws of all 50
states and can serve as the predicate for wire or mail fraud prosecutions at the
federal level.
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 707 (1994).
55 See id. § 7 11 a.
56 This conduct is addressed with reasonable specificity by 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 46306(b) (West 1995).
57 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994).
58 See id. § 1125(a) (1).
59 Id. § 1117(a).
60 See id. § 1125(a) (1).
61 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (1994) (stating that a second offense by a corporate
offender can result in a fine of up to $15,000,000).
62 Id. § 1962.
63 See id. § 1962(c); Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428,
437-38 (D.D.C. 1992).




as a "person" is made up of its employees and cannot conspire
with itself. The corporation can, however, conspire with outsid-
ers,65 such as the purchasers of data plates. The criminal penal-
ties for a violation of RICO include imprisonment for up to
twenty years (or life, under certain circumstances) and forfei-
ture of all proceeds and properties of the enterprise.66
V. CIVIL REMEDIES
Civil prosecution of the counterfeiters of aircraft and aircraft
parts has proven to be impractical, despite the panoply of vari-
ous civil remedies normally available to victims of commercial
injuries. This impractibility arises from the expense of such suits
and their failure to obtain the desired results. To make matters
worse, the current regulatory and litigation environment sub-
jects a manufacturer who reports a known or suspected counter-
feit to the FAA or other public agencies to claims against it by
the counterfeiters and their holders in due course. The manu-
facturer that refrains from pursuing counterfeiters, however,
may be held to have waived its rights.67
The implements of the counterfeiting process are widely avail-
able and, unlike the specialized engraving tools and printing
presses traditionally associated with the counterfeiting of cur-
rency, indistinguishable from the tools of a legitimate business.
The principal perpetrators of these deeds typically carry on su-
perficially legitimate helicopter repair or operations enterprises,
which often serve to "launder" their bogus machines. In fact, the
best known repeat offenders have erected labyrinthine corpo-
rate ziggurats6" which serve to conceal assets and offer opportu-
nities to bankrupt appendages, thus avoiding liability while
leaving the core operations intact.
See, e.g., Georgia Gulf Corp. v. Ward, 701 F. Supp. 1556, 1560 (N.D. Ga.
1987).
66 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1994).
67 In re Circuit Breaker Litig., 852 F. Supp. 883, 895 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
Although the court found that the defendants had committed trademark in-
fringements, it held that the plaintiff had essentially waived its right to private
action because it knew of the violations, but took no action. Id. at 895, 897.
68 Steve Howell of the Fort Worth, Texas law firm of Brown, Herman, Scott,
Dean & Miles coined this felicitous expression. One example of this type of oper-
ation involves a California operator that remanufactures aircraft under one cor-
porate name and operates the aircraft in the name of a separate de facto
corporation owned in the name of the majority individual shareholder. The air-
craft is then sold in yet another name.
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For the reasons stated, the civil remedies available are most
often invoked in the defense of lawsuits arising out of accidents
involving counterfeit aircraft. In such cases, a host of defenses
are typically available in addition to the remedies available to
the original airframe manufacturer against the counterfeiter.
These include, inter alia, the government contractor defense,6"
the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994,70 the substantial
modification defense, 71 and what may be called, for lack of a
better term, the "counterfeit aircraft" defense. The basis of the
"counterfeit aircraft" defense is that the company which origi-
nally issued the data plate is not the manufacturer of the assem-
bly of parts to which it is now affixed (even though it may have
manufactured all or most of the individual parts and compo-
nents). The other defenses have been substantially elaborated in
articles and programs dedicated to that purpose. The following
discussion concentrates on the "counterfeit aircraft" defense.
The only decision expressly addressing the "counterfeit air-
craft" defense is Goldsmith v. Olon Andrews, Inc.,72 briefly de-
scribed in Example 3, above. In that case, plaintiffs, who had
been injured in a crash and fire which consumed the aircraft,
sued Bell Helicopter Textron under Ohio state law based on the
allegedly defective and negligent design of the fuel system. The
helicopter had been assembled from new and used spare parts
manufactured by Bell Helicopter Textron. Plaintiffs contended
that Bell had originated the design and thereafter supported it
by making available its manuals and spare parts. The court ob-
served that the fuel system assembled by Olympic did not in-
clude the retrofit kit, required by Bell since 1977 but not by the
FAA, for fiberglass-wrapped fuel' tanks and breakaway fittings for
the fuel lines. The court found that had Bell resumed produc-
tion of the Model 47 after 1977, the FAA would have required it
to include the improvements in new helicopters, even though it
did not require their inclusion in existing aircraft. 73
69 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513-14 (1988).
70 Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994), reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 40,101
note, sec. 2 (West 1995).
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (b) (1965).
72 941 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1991). It should again be observed that the creation
of the aircraft involved in this case was not a criminal act. However, the defenses
available to the original manufacturer of this type of aircraft in a civil action are
identical to those which would be raised in a true counterfeit aircraft situation.
73 Id. at 425.
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The trial court refused to deem Bell a "seller" of the helicop-
ter based solely on the fact that it created the design upon which
Olympic relied in assembling the helicopter.7 ' The court noted:
[T] here is no evidence that Bell was in the business of placing
this design in commerce. Bell did not offer for sale any designs,
plans, or blueprints for the Model 47 or its fuel system. In fact,
Bell had made two improvements to the fuel system and issued
an Alert Service Bulletin recommending installation of the new
system. 7
The court reasoned that Bell should not be deemed a "seller" of
the helicopter because "Bell did not control production of the
helicopter, could not assure conformance with its improved de-
signs, and was in no position to treat the risks of producing the
helicopter as a cost of production, or obtain liability
insurance."76
The elements of the counterfeit aircraft defense, therefore,
go to the heart of the theory77 underlying the Restatement defi-
nition of strict product liability.78 Goldsmith concerned an air-
craft which had been built from scratch by a third party, as
opposed to one which had been resurrected, literally, from the
ashes like the legendary Phoenix. In either case, the responsi-
bility for introducing the aircraft as then constituted into the
stream of commerce is that of the re-builder.79 Virtually every
state focuses its version of strict product liability on the manufac-
turer, seller, or distributor who places a defective product into
the stream of commerce."0 This reasoning is the locution
adopted to broaden the definition beyond "sale." Courts have
reasoned that "[i] t is the defendant's participatory connection,
for his personal profit or other benefit, with the injury-produc-
ing product and with the enterprise that created consumer de-
mand for and reliance upon the product . . . which calls for
imposition of strict liability.""1
74 Id. at 427.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149-50 (Cal. 1965) (holding
that strict liability in tort is limited to recovery for personal injuries).
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
79 See East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1127 (D.C. 1990).
80 See, e.g., Koehring Mfg. Co. v. Earthmovers of Fairbanks, Inc., 763 P.2d 499,
504-05 (Alaska 1988); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 321 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972); Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1055-58 (Colo.
1987); East Penn, 578 A.2d at 1126-27.
81 Kase4 101 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
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Regardless of the theory which liability is predicated upon,
whether negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability in tort, or
other grounds, it is obvious that to hold a producer, manufac-
turer, or seller liable for injury caused by a particular product,
there must first be proof that the defendant produced, manufac-
tured, sold, or was in some way responsible for the product .... 2
Another formulation, especially applicable to the counterfeit
aircraft situation, is that "the imposition of liability depends
upon a showing by the plaintiff that his or her injuries were
caused, by the act of the defendant or by an instrumentality
under the defendant's control."83
Used-product merchants who rebuild or recondition their
merchandise, even when they do not misrepresent their goods,
have been held to be subject to strict liability. 84 The remanufac-
turer of the product will probably be deprived of any defense
under a statute of repose85 on the grounds that its resurrection
has made it a "new" product.86 By its nature, such remanufac-
turing or resurrection may frequently constitute such an altera-
tion or modification of the product as to avoid the application
of the Restatement rule which states that the product must
reach the user or consumer "without substantial change in the
condition in which it [was] sold." 87 The general rule in this re-
gard stems from the principle of superseding cause, stating that
whether the modification is a superseding cause depends in part
82 Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(quoting Annotation, Products Liability: Necessity and Sufficiency of Identification of
Defendant as Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, 51
A.L.R.3d 1344, 1349 (1973)).
83 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); see Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 395, 397 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985) (specifically addressing the duty to warn); Groll v. Shell Oil Co., 196
Cal. Rptr. 52, 54-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Walker v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 96 Cal.
Rptr. 803, 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
84 See, e.g., Barrett v. Superior Ct., 272 Cal. Rptr. 304, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990);
Anderson v. Olmsted Util. Equip., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 626, 629-31 (Ohio 1991);
Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31, 34 (S.D. 1983).
. 85 An example of such a defense is the General Aviation Revitalization Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-272 § 1(e), 108 Stat. 1094 (1994) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101).
86 See, e.g., Rollins v. Cherokee Warehouses, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 136, 139 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986) (holding that Tennessee's ten-year statute of limitations does not
bar an action if the defendant was engaged in the business of selling re-condi-
tioned forklifts at the time it sold a forklift to the plaintiff).,
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (b) (1965).
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on whether it was reasonably foreseeable.88 Some states, how-
ever, preclude recovery against the original manufacturer even
if the subsequent modification was foreseeable. 89 The lack of
control by the original manufacturer over the subsequent modi-
fication of the product can also relieve the original manufac-
turer of the duty to warn of its dangers.90
Another potentially liable party is one which the always crea-
tive plaintiffs' bar has not yet discovered: the insurer who sells
the data plate following the destruction of the aircraft. The in-
surer has clearly put a defective (scorched, warped, and nonfly-
able) product in the stream of commerce. This situation has
been the subject of discussions with insurers in the United States
and abroad91 and may be the subject of litigation in the near
future. One of the weapons potentially available against both
the counterfeiter and the insurer which supplied the means of
producing the counterfeit (the data plate) is civil RICO,92 which
provides for recovery of treble damages and attorneys' fees.
The many defenses readily available to the original manufac-
turer against claims stemming from counterfeit aircraft are not
without a price. The associated efforts can generate negative
customer relations and inevitably result in substantial expense
and exposure. Victories in such cases often come only after ex-
pending many hours, hundreds of thousands of dollars, and
years of risk.
VI. NON-JUDICIAL APPROACHES
The insurers and the FAA are both weak links in the chain
from which counterfeit aircraft is forged. Insurers sell data
88 See Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 59 P.2d 100, 103 (Cal. 1936); Powe, 212
Cal. Rptr. at 397.
89 See, e.g., Hines v.Joy Mfg. Co., 850 F.2d 1146, 1151 (6th Cir. 1988) (refusing
to read the common law concept of foreseeability into the product liability doc-
trine); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440, 443
(N.Y. 1980) (holding that principles of foreseeability do not apply where a third
party affirmatively abuses a product).
90 See, e.g., Grol, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 54-55 (holding that a flammable liquid manu-
facturer providing sufficient warnings to the distributor was not responsible for
warning the ultimate consumer); Walker, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 806 (holding that a bulk
manufacturer of sulfuric acid did not have a duty to protect the general public
from harm).
91 James L. Burt & Roy Fox, Bogus Parts, Bogus Aircraft: Legal Considerations,
Presentation at Lloyd's in London (Nov. 30, 1994); Insurance: Technology,
Training, Legal and Legislative, Helicopter International Association Workshop
(Nov. 1, 1995).
92 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).,
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plates and historical records as "salvage" even when there is no
intact metal part other than the identification plate itself. The
chain is further forged by the FAA airworthiness inspectors who
issue airworthiness certificates for the resurrected aircraft, de-
spite clear evidence in the FAA file of the prior destruction of
the machine.93 Accordingly, the major U.S. manufacturers of
helicopters are taking or considering the following steps:
1. Attempting to educate insurers of aviation risks as to the un-
desirability of reselling data plates and historical records from
destroyed aircraft.
2. Offering to provide insurers and purchasers of aircraft with
accident history information prior to purchasing, insuring, or
paying a loss on a used aircraft.
3. Petitioning the FAA to strike from the type certificate data
sheets the serial numbers of aircraft known to be destroyed.
4. Petitioning the FAA to adopt a rule requiring the agency to
confiscate the data plates of aircraft declared destroyed as a re-
sult of an official investigation.
For their part, several aviation insurers have begun to adopt
policies and procedures which may help control this problem.
For instance, United States Aviation Insurance Group (USAIG)
has established a policy with regard to aircraft damaged beyond
economical repair: USAIG will not resell the data plate, and
USAIG inserts language enforcing this into salvage bid requests
and settlement documents with its insured. Also USAIG stamps
an endorsement into the logbooks of constructive total loss air-
craft, informing future purchasers that the subject aircraft was
involved in a specified incident, rendering it a constructive total
loss, and thus, not repairable within the aircraft's insured value.
The British Aviation Group, AAU, American Eagle, and
AVEMCO are among those companies which have adopted simi-
lar policies.
These procedures, if heeded and adopted by the pertinent
parties, should over a period of time go a long way toward end-
ing the problems associated with the resurrection of destroyed
aircraft. The threat from aircraft newly built from surplus parts
will remain, but it is focused at the bottom end of the commer-
93 There are happy exceptions. For example, Morton v. Dow, 525 F.2d 1302
(10th Cir. 1975), recounts the story of a Bell Model 205A helicopter which was
totally destroyed in 1972, resurrected by adding numerous parts to the data plate,
and granted an .airworthiness certificate by an unsuspecting FSDO inspector.
Bell complained, the FAA revoked the certificate, and the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit upheld the revocation. Id. at 1307.
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cial market and is a lesser risk both to the public and to
manufacturers.
VII. CONCLUSION
The problem of counterfeit aircraft is a real one, with legal,
commercial, and, especially, safety implications. The regulatory
(FAA) and judicial systems, despite great promise, have in prac-
tice been of little value in addressing these concerns. Insurers
can make the most significant non-judicial contributions, espe-
cially since the original manufacturers are eager to assist them
in combatting this problem. Awareness of the issues and contin-
ued communication are the keys to success. In time, the regula-
tory and judicial functions may also contribute.

